complex interactions of multiple end points in Web Services mostly consist of sub-processes or sub-protocols, which are reused as modular and need to comply with corresponding standards and proposals. However, the consistency of local and global properties of interactions is important for practical applications with high security requirement. Therefore, a method is proposed to formally describe composed interactions with the definition of basic and composed interaction model for Web Services. Furthermore, the semantic of interactions, is presented as a path of transitions in Action-based Kripke Transition System, on which some properties, such as secrecy and authentication, are described and verified as formulae in Past Linear Temporal Logic. Then a scenario of composed interactions for Web Services is given and some formal properties corresponding to security are more effectively checked by our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularity of Internet and the application of Web services-based distributed computing model of SOC, more and more standards and proposals have been defined for dealing with different concerns. As a result, the complexity of applications requires various standards or specifications be used in measure of high flexibility and modularity for Web services. So, composed interacting procedures, which follow current standards and proposals, broadly exist in communications of endpoints and need to be considered whether properties of the whole interactions are satisfied, not just that of subprotocol or sub-procedure.
A.. Security Verificaiton for Web Services
Due to its growing importance, Web Services requires rigorous security. As a difference method against relying on a secure transport layer, a more suitable way of securing SOAP messages is using the Web services interactive protocol stack to realize the goal of 'End-toEnd ' security or trust. However, Web service is based on the semi-structure of XML. In particular, for the diversity of XML and the combination of Web Services specifications, it is definitely necessary to verify its security. Meanwhile, the theoretical community has been very successful in the last decade in developing methods for analyzing cryptographic protocols. If a SOAP messaging is transferred into a protocol, the methodologies and tools, Intruding Model, and Model checking technologies could be applied in verifying the semantic properties of the interactions among participants as Web Services as well as the analysis of security protocol.
B. Research on the Security of Web Services
Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Cedric Fournet et al [1] , propose a new specification language TulaFale for writing machine-checkable descriptions of SOAP-based security protocols and their properties. The TulaFale language is based on the pi calculus, plus XML syntax (to express SOAP messaging), logical predicates (to construct and filter SOAP messages), and correspondence assertions (to specify authentication goals of protocols). Then TulaFale is complied into the applied pi calculus, and then runs Blanchet'sresolution-based protocol verifier [2] . We will use it as a reference to be compared on some figures in an examination.
E. Kleiner and A.W. Roscoe [3] propose a method for mapping interacting messages to abstract symbols in the style of Dolev-Yao, and Casper notation. They show that this translation preserves flaws and attacks. Meanwhile, they provide a way for analyzing WS-Security protocols. And also they demonstrate how the approach can be used to prove some property and discover attacks upon an application oft WS-SecureConversation .
In [4] , Michael Backes1et al, take a security analysis to a concrete scenario, WS-ReliableMessaging,, from the aspects of symbols and encryption and use the Automated Validation for Internet Security Protocol and Application (AVISPA) [5] tools and OFMC [6] to establish an abstract model from the interactive scripts in protocol specification language. But the scenario is too simple and only includes tow participants: a client and server. In this paper, a more complex scenario is proposed, in which a client, a proxy and a server interoperate with each other and comply with the specifications corresponding.
With the development of the technologies involving Web services composition and modeling the composition of services, Barbara Carminati et al put efforts on security constraint-based Web services composition. The requirements come from the management and schedule of service procedures that should be prevented from threads to secrecy, integrity, privacy, availability and anonymous properties [7] . Moreover, Barbara Carminati proposes that the security policy and capability of Web services be defined by DAML-S and a non-center mode of policy management be established to implement the satisfaction to security constraint during composing Web services.
Beside mentioned above, Lalana Kagal et al present some ontology of policy language and a distributed solution for policy management to enhance the traditional identification and access control framework. As a result, the responsibility and Obligations of Web services are depicted in security policy to realize the dynamic and non-center management [8] .
C. My Work
Comparing with these approaches, this paper proposes a mechanism to verify the security of composed interactions for web services. Specially, a scenario of composed interaction for Web Services has been presented in trust brokering mode that satisfies the demand of deriving keys from shared secret and keys permessage, which are specified in WS-Trust and WSSecureConversation. Furthermore, the abstract model of the scenario is built on Action based Kripke Transition System and is verified by AVISPA. Finally, a comparison with a tool of TulaFale is presented at the end.
D. Structure of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines a conceptual interaction model for messaging in web services. Specially, with presenting a concrete scenario of composed interaction in trust broking model, the preparation of discussing the security of composed interactions for Web Services is completed. In Section III, the semantic of High Level Protocol Specification Language [9] (HLPSL for short.) is introduced as well as Action based Kripke Transition System (AKTS for short) is proposed to make the semantic of interactions more clear and extend the expression capability of temporal properties. In Section IV, we present the major description of a composed interaction in a variety of HLPSL and verify the security by composing basic roles. Section V lists the experiment result that shows some advantage comparing with another tool, TulaFale. Section VI is a conclusion and future plan.
II. INTERACTION MODEL FOR WEB SERVICES

A. Definitions of Basic and Composed Interaction Model
Define 1: A Basic and Composed Interaction Model (IM for short). A protocol or standard specification that depicts the behavior of messages exchanged is defined as an interaction model, denoted with * Φ < > shown in Fig.  1 .
So, if an interaction model is parameterized in another one, the last one is a composed IM.
B. WS-Trust and it's Interaction Model
WS-Trust [10] specifies a trust mode and a security token service framework in which applications establish a secure context to exchange SOAP messages on a mechanism how to deliver and proxy a security token, namely a claim to a resource, such as identity, key, name etc. The trust model is a procedure in which the SOAP messages from a requester should proof what they claim is trusted Moreover, WS-Trust also descriptively defines the issuance, canceling, updating, and negotiation of security token in a security token service framework shown as Fig. 2 .
. But any mandatory and specific procedure or protocol does not exist in WS-Trust. So a formal definition of interacting profiles is proposed as shown in Fig. 3 .
Define2: Interaction Model on WS-Trust.
( , 
C. WS-SC and it's Interaction Model
Comparing with the specification of message authentication, such as WS-Security, which provides basic secure mechanism toward one-way messaging, the intention of WS-SecureConversation [11] (WS-SC for short) guarantees the security for a sequence of messages exchanged between participants and provides a mechanism of context oriented authentication, denoted with security context (SC for short) or session. Therefore, the performance and security of multiple interactions is improved for the mechanism. Moreover, a security context is shared among participants for the life of a communication session, which is indicated by a token that can be created by binding WS-Trust. The target of WS-SC is to establish a security context and amend it when need and specify how to derive shared key in multiple messages, even derive one key per message. As a reference to WS-Trust, a WS-SC interaction model is defined as shown in Fig. 4 . 
D. A Scinario of Composed Interaction for Web services
We reference to the framework and pattern of WSTrust and WS-SecureConversation and establish a scenario for discussing composed interactions, which are based on trust brokering model for Web Services. The scenario includes three participants: a client, a Web service and a (STS . For a convenient discussion, we assume the Web service shares secretes, authentication information and security tokens with STS by an internal mechanism, and the client, service and STS have been authenticated by an authority respectively with the certifications. As a fixed trusted root and a brokering service, the STS provides with security context tokens (SCTs for short) for the communication between the client and service. For accessing the Web service, the client requests a SCT from STS to protect a series of messages by the sequence of derived session keys. For the restriction of the paper's space, the amending, canceling and renewing security context mentioned in WS-SC are not discussed. Then the whole interactions include tow phases shown as the following Fig. 5 . One is for the client to acquire a SCT issued by the STS involving the first step and the second step; another is for the client to interact with the Web service in a secure context, which is protected by the derivation of shared key referencing to the SCT and relates to step-3i and step-4i iteratively.
So, we can give a formal description as shown in Fig. 6 for the issue about verifying the security of an interaction model for Web services. Moreover, we will discuses the semantic of composed interaction in an extensive Kripke structure and further to check the security of the scenario mentioned above.
III. FUNDACTION OF VERIFYING SECURITY OF INTERACTIONS FOR WEB SERVICES
HLPSL is a formal language to specify the protocol and the security problems in AVISPA, which defines control flow, data structure, alternative adversary models and complicated security properties based on roles in a protocol. In this paper, basic and composed interactions are depicted by a variety of HLPSL Interaction specifications in a variety of HLPSL are composed of roles that are parameterized with respect to a set of typed variables. And the roles can be categorized into tow type. Some roles, called basic role and denoted with
Role Ψ , serve to describe behaviors of one single agent during a run of a protocol or sub-protocol; Other roles, called composed roles and denoted with ( ) P P Role Ψ , instantiate these basic roles to model a scenario the protocol designer intends to analyze with respect to some security goals. For example, an entire interacting run (potentially consisting of the execution of multiple subprotocols), and a session of the protocol between multiple agents are possible scenarios of interest. Provided a set of roles describing a concrete scenario, the security goals are to be defined as safety temporal properties. A. TLA based Formal Semantic of HLPSL As shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 Role Ψ of several basic roles is defined to express an interoperable scenario. As mentioned in [9] , the roles can be translated into Temporal Logic of Action (TLA for short) as following:
B. Formal Semantic of HLPSL in AKTS（Action based Kripke Transition System）
The semantic of HLPSL based on TLA has been presented generally as above. However, for more convince to verify common properties, a Past Linear Temporal Logical based on extensive Kripke Transition System is proposed with a mean of translating TLA of ( ) 
A. Syntax of HPSPL
HLPSL is exactly appropriate to describe the composed interacting behaviors on TLA. And for convenience, a variety of HLPSL is shown in Fig. 18 .
B. Abstract description of Composed IM in HLPSL
The abstract description of the scenario mentioned before as a classic composed IM is specified in a variety of HLPSL with the symbols defined in Fig. 19 .
The client is a composed role in the scenario of composed interactions, in which the basic role of STS_Client follows the specification of WS-Trust to request a security context token as shown in Fig. 20 , another basic role of SC_Client continuously accesses a service and be protected from deriving a shared key per messaging,, specified in WS-SC with a security context token as shown in Fig. 21 . Moreover, the composed role of the tow basic is also presented in Fig. 21 . The service of SC_Server is a basic role and the interacting behaviors are defined as shown in Fig. 22 , in which different keys are derived for signing and encrypting messages from a shared secrete by the algorithm PSHA1. Additionally, in order to keep the keys fresh, a mechanism of subsequent derivation is presented in Fig. 22 .
The services of STS_Server as a special web services is a basic role and the behaviors of interactions are shown in Fig. 23 ., which depicts how STS authenticates the requester and the target service and responds a security context token to STS_Client.
, concatenation, such as Z*Y*X; =>, pase a segment into elements by type; {x}_k, message x encrypted by a key k , which can be symmetric or asymmetric key; {x}_inv(k), message x encrypted * 
C. Security of the composed interaction for Web services
As one aspect for the security of interaction description, the secrete indicated by the syntax secrete(...) in HLPSL, is defined by two stages, which are respectively shown as the following:
• Building a security context These described in the Fig. 25 are all the secrete terms shared by client and STS.
• Messaging in a security context These described in the Fig. 26 are all common secrete terms with the client C and the service S.
As another aspect of the protocol, AVISPA checks the correspondence of witness (...) and request (…) to validate the authentication, which is defined by two • Building a security context Those described in Fig. 27 are authenticated in AVISPA.
• Messaging in a security context Those described in Fig. 28 are authenticated in AVISPA.
V EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Only the back-end CL_AtSe [12] successfully verifies the secrecy and authentication of the abstract model specified by HLPSL for the composed interactions in AVISPA. Additionally, Comparing with another analyzer TulaFale, which is combined with Blanchet' ProVerif based on Pi calculus, HLPSL and CL_AtSe are better in performance and scales of the validation of security protocols with the result shown as the following Tab I. Complying with the specifications WS-Trust and WS-SC, a scenario of interactions for Web Services is presented to specially refine the brokering model with the mechanisms of deriving keys and per-message keys. Furthermore, AKTS is proposed to enhance the semantic of temporal logic to check the validity of more properties, specially secrecy and authentication. Moreover, the definitions are how to build AKTS from HLPSL. In future, we hope that the study on AKTS will be done about the inter-operation scenario with more complicated exchanges and more combined properties. 
